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1 Introduction
Renewables such as solar and wind already account for up to 30% of power generation in the
UK, Germany and parts of the US (Pollitt & Anaya 2015), and global decarbonization objectives
will require further large-scale investment. Due to near-zero marginal costs, renewables come
with a merit-order e¤ectof displacing conventional generators (Green & Léautier 2015; Liski
& Vehvilainen 2015).
The literature on wholesale electricity markets emphasizes how forward contracting can
mitigate market power (e.g., Wolak 2000; Ausubel & Cramton 2010). Such commitments can
take the form of forward contracting (Allaz & Vila 1993) or retail sales (Bushnell, Mansur
& Saravia 2008).1 In practice, power generators indeed sell forward a signicant fraction of
production (Anderson, Hu & Winchester 2007).
This paper examines the interaction between renewables competition and forward contract-
ing. The model generalizes Allaz & Vila (1993) to (i) incorporate the intermittent nature of
renewables production, and (ii) allow for n > 2 strategic players, with cost heterogeneity to
represent di¤erent generation technologies.
2 Model
Consider a wholesale electricity market with a set N = f1; 2; :::; ng of n  2 incumbent
electricity generators. Renewables are installed with capacity R, with zero marginal costs.2
Assume that the n rms are active(i.e., protable); as will become clear, this holds as long
as renewables capacity is not too large, R < R:
There are M  2 states of the world, reecting the intermittency of renewables production.
State m occurs with probability m 2 (0; 1) where
PM
k=1 k  1. In state m, the rate of capacity
utilization of renewables is m 2 (0; 1], ordered as 1 > 2 > ::: > M . Firm i 2 N sells xmi
units at marginal cost ci, so total conventional output Xm 
P
i2N x
m
i .
Electricity buyers form a linear demand curve p(Q) =   Q, where Q is consumption and
(; ) > 0. There is market clearing in each state of the world, so prices are state-contingent:
in state m, total output satises Qm = Xm + mR, and electricity trades at a price pm.
The timing of the game is as follows. In Stage 1, each incumbent chooses its forward
commitment yi. Following Allaz & Vila (1993), Bushnell (2007), Fowlie (2009) and others, the
contract market is assumed to be competitive with no arbitrage prots; as noted by Allaz & Vila
(1993), this would be the case, e.g., in the presence of two Bertrand speculators.3 Then the state
of the world m is revealed. In Stage 2, each incumbent chooses its output x
m
i . Incumbents each
1This paper takes the same approach as this literature in that it examines the strategic incentive for forward
contracting rather than the hedging motive driven by risk aversion.
2For simplicity, renewables are grouped into a single capacity gure.
3Forward markets can be more competitive than spot markets due to the participation of nancial players
like banks and commodity traders (who do not own physical assets). In several major European systems, e.g.,
Germany and the Nordics, forward markets are highly liquid with traded volumes being 3-6 times larger than
underlying consumption (ECA 2015). The Nordic nancial electricity market has 400 participants and the Top
5 playerscombined market share is only 25% (NordREG 2010). By contrast, wholesale spot markets are often
still dominated by a small number of large players.
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maximize prots while interacting strategically; renewables production is non-strategic. Firms
choices are assumed to be observable and there is no discounting. The game is solved for the
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
3 Results
The main question is, what is the equilibrium impact of more renewables capacity R? This
could arise because of renewables subsidies or due to technological progress which reduces their
investment costs.
First-order conditions
In Stage 2, the state of the world m is known. Firm is problem is to:
max
xmi
f(xmi   yi)pm   cixmi g
where yi is its forward commitment made in Stage 1, and demand pm =  (Xm+mR). The
rm here only makes revenues on its uncommitted units (xmi   yi). The rst-order condition is:
0 = (pm   ci)  (xmi   yi) = [  (Xm + mR)  ci]  (xmi   yi). (1)
These n rst-order conditions dene incumbentsoptimal output choices as a function of con-
tracts. Let Y =(y1; y2; :::; yn) denote forward positions, leading to outputs xmi = xi(Y;m) for
each i 2 N , and thus Xm = X(Y;m) and pm = p(Y;m) for each state m.
In Stage 1, the state of the world is not yet known, so rm i maximizes its expected prots:
max
yi
Ei =
XM
k=1
k
n
(pk   ci)xki + (pf   pk)yi
o
.
The rst term reects spot-market prots and the second term represents forward-market prots
at price pf . With a competitive forward market, the latter is zero since pf =
PM
k=1 kpk by the
no-arbitrage condition.
Thus rm is problem boils down to:
max
yi
Ei =
XM
k=1
k [p(Y;k)  ci]xi(Y;k),
which makes explicit the dependencies on the contract position arising in Stage 2. The rst-order
condition is:
0 =
XM
k=1
k

[p(Y;k)  ci]
dxi(Y;k)
dyi
  xi(Y;k)
dX(Y;k)
dyi

. (2)
This reects how rm is forward commitment yi a¤ects its own subsequent production xmi as
well as total output Xm in each of the M states.
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Lemma 1. In state m, the incumbent rmsoutput responses in Stage 2 satisfy:
dX(Y;k)
dyi
=
1
(n+ 1)
> 0 and
dxi(Y;m)
dyi
=
n
(n+ 1)
> 0.
Proof. Summing (1) over all n rms gives:
0 = n [  (X(Y;m) + mR)] 
X
i2N
ci   [X(Y;m)  Y ].
Solving this for aggregate output gives:
X(Y;m) =
n(  mR) 
P
i2N ci + Y
(n+ 1)
=) dX(Y;m)
dyi
=
dX(Y;m)
dY
=
1
(n+ 1)
(3)
since Y Pi2N yi, and so dY=dyi = 1. Rearranging (1) shows that for rm i:
xi(Y;m) = yi +
(  ci)

  [X(Y;m) + mR] =)
dxi(Y;m)
dyi
= 1  dX(Y;m)
dyi
,
which using (3) conrms that dxi(Y;m)=dyi = n=(n+ 1).
Lemma 1 shows that the pro-competitive e¤ect of forward contracting (Allaz & Vila, 1993)
survives under the presence of renewables. This reects that competition in Stage 2 is in strategic
substitutes: if rm i raises its output, then it is optimal for its rivals to cut back (and so
dxi=dyi > dX=dyi > 0).
A key observation is that these output responses are state-independent : they do not vary
with renewables utilization m, which only has an impact on the levels of prices and quantities.
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Equilibrium
The equilibrium is dened by the n(M+1) rst-order conditions for fxmi gni=1 in each ofM states
plus fyigni=1. Label this as bxmi = xi( bY;m) and byi for each i 2 N , and thus bXm = X( bY;m),bY =Pi2N byi and bpm = p( bY;m).
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, rm i engages in forward contracting according to:
byi = (n  1)
n
XM
k=1
kbxki .
Proof. By (1), optimality in Stage 2 implies (bpm   ci) = (bxmi   byi), in equilibrium, for rm i,
and using this in the rst-order condition for Stage 1 from (2) gives:
0 = 
XM
k=1
k
(
(bxki   byi) dxi(Y;k)dyi

fbxki gni=1   bxki
dX(Y;k)
dyi

fbxki gni=1
)
= 
XM
k=1
k

n(bxki   byi)
(n+ 1)
  bxki
(n+ 1)

,
4This is a feature of the linear-quadratic model setup.
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where the second line uses Lemma 1. Further rearranging gives:
0 =
XM
k=1
k

(n  1)
n
bxki   byi =) byi = (n  1)n XMk=1 kbxki ,
since
PM
k=1 k  1.
Each rm would like to sell forward a fraction (n   1)=n of its subsequent output in each
state, which exceeds 50% but falls short of complete contracting. However, because of renewables
intermittency, its optimal strategy is to sell forward this fraction of expected output.
Such forward contracting is in line with real-world practice: contract cover has ranged from
73 to 95% across the UK, New Zealand, and various US markets (Anderson, Hu & Winchester
2007).
Lemma 3. The equilibrium output choices for each state m and the equilibrium forward con-
tracting position of rm i are given by:
byi = (n  1)


(  ci)  n
2
(n2 + 1)
(  c)

  (n  1)
(n2 + 1)
R
XM
k=1
kk
bxmi = n

(  ci)  n
2
(n2 + 1)
(  c)

  R
(n+ 1)

m +
(n  1)
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk

,
where c  1n
P
i2N ci is the (unweighted) average unit cost of rms.
Proof. See Appendix.
Firm is output bxmi in state m depends individually on the renewable load factor m, while
its forward position byi can depend only on the average PMk=1 kk.
Firm i is indeed active in state m as long as it makes a positive margin bpm > ci () bxmi > byi.
Using Lemma 3, a su¢ cient condition for all n rms to be active in all M states, as is assumed
throughout, is thus given by:
R <
(n+ 1)


( maxifcigni=1) 
n2
(n2 + 1)
(  c)


maxkfkgMk=1  
n(n  1)
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk
  R.
Lemma 3 leads to the following main results:
Proposition 1. More renewables competition:
(i) reduces the equilibrium volume of forward contracting by rm i, dbyi=dR < 0;
(ii) leads to the equilibrium displacement of rm is production in each state m, dbxmi =dR < 0.
Proof. Follows by inspection of Lemma 3.
Proposition 1 identies the forward-contracting e¤ect of renewables competition. More re-
newables displace incumbent producers according to the well-known merit-order e¤ect. However,
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this makes the market less attractive to incumbents, which reduces their incentive to make for-
ward commitments.
Renewables thus directly raise the intensity of competition in the wholesale market but
indirectly reduce the intensity of rivalry amongst incumbents.
Proposition 2. (i) More renewables competition raises the equilibrium price in state m if and
only if the forward-contracting e¤ect outweighs the merit-order e¤ect; this holds in all states of
the world for which renewablescapacity utilization is su¢ ciently low:
dbpm
dR
> 0() m <
 
 d
bY
dR
!
=
n(n  1)
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk  ,
while the equilibrium price falls in all other states, with m  .
(ii) More renewables decrease the average equilibrium price as measured by the forward price:
dbpf
dR
=   
(n+ 1)

1  n(n  1)
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk < 0.
Proof. For part (i), the price impact is given by:
dbpm
dR
=
@bpm
@R
bY xed + dbpmdY

Y=bY
dbY
dR
. (4)
Since demand curve in state m, at equilibrium, is bpm =   [ bXm + mR], it follows that:
dbpm
dR
bY xed =  
 
d bXm
dR
bY xed + m
!
=   m
(n+ 1)
< 0,
and
@bpm
@Y

Y=bY =  
d bXm
dY

Y=bY =  

(n+ 1)
< 0
which both use (3), at equilibrium. Putting these results together in (4) yields:
dbpm
dR
=   
(n+ 1)
 
m +
dbY
dR
!
.
Using the result for dbyi=dR < 0 from Proposition 1 conrms:
dbY
dR

X
i2N
dbyi
dR
=  n(n  1)
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk < 0, (5)
and the claims follow. For part (ii), the equilibrium forward price equals the expected spot price,
and so: bpf =XM
k=1
kbpk =) dbpf
dR
=
XM
k=1
k
dbpk
dR
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Using (5) gives:
dbpf
dR
=   
(n+ 1)

1  n(n  1)
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk < 0, (6)
which proves the result since n  2.
Renewables can raise the electricity price. The merit-order e¤ect is always present but weaker
for states with lower m. The forward-contracting e¤ect is equally strong because commitments
are not state-contingent. So prices rise for lowm, and fall for highvalues of m.
Specically, price rises if m < '
PM
k=1 kk by the fraction '  n(n  1)=(n2 + 1) 2 [25 ; 1).
With six incumbents, states with utilization below '  80% of the average experience higher
prices. In the binary case where renewables are either at capacity or inactive, the condition is
always met in the inactive state (for any n  2).
Large spreads in renewables capacity factors are borne out in practice (Borenstein 2012;
Pollitt & Anaya 2015). Averages for wind are typically  3040% while they are as low as 10%
for solar. Peak capacity factors for wind can exceed 80% while utilization in Germany has been
as low as 5% on some days with a zero contribution by solar.
4 Conclusion
Renewables competition can weaken the role of forward contracting in mitigating market power
in wholesale electricity markets and lead to higher prices in states with strong intermittency.
These knock-on e¤ects of renewables may deserve more attention from policymakers and ana-
lysts. The results should also lend themselves to empirical and experimental testing.
These insights are likely robust in various directions. Demand uncertainty in form of state-
contingent fkgMk=1 would also not a¤ect strategic responses at the margin so the comparative
statics still hold. Renewables competition R > R could induce exit of higher-cost incumbents,
altering the set of rms N . Exit raises prices across all states and reduces the degree of for-
ward contracting which would exacerbate the price-increasing e¤ect. Increasing marginal costs
would reduce forward contracting relative to the standard Allaz-Vila model with constant unit
costs (Bushnell 2007). This would likely dampen the comparative statics but not overturn them.
Future research could examine the impact of renewables in a model where strategic behaviour
also prevails in the contract market, and pursue a welfare analysis that incorporates renewables
investment costs and the social value of emissions reductions achieved.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof rst determines the market-level equilibrium quantities for bXm
and bY , and then derives the rm-level analogs. From (3), in equilibrium:
bXm = n [(  c)  mR] +  bY
(n+ 1)
, (7)
where c  1n
P
i2N ci is the average unit cost of rms. Lemma 2 implies bY = (n 1)n PMk=1 k bXk
at the market-level; using (10) repeatedly in it gives:
bY = (n  1)
n
XM
k=1
k
n [(  c)  kR] +  bY
(n+ 1)
=
(n  1)
n(n+ 1)

n

(  c)  R
XM
k=1
kk

+  bY  , (8)
which uses
XM
k=1
k  1. Solving (8) for bY yields:
bY = n(n  1)
(n2 + 1)

(  c)  R
XM
k=1
kk

. (9)
Finally, using (9) in (7) and solving out gives:
bXm = n(  c)

1 +
(n  1)
(n2 + 1)

  nR

m +
(n  1)
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk

(n+ 1)
=
n
(n+ 1)

n(n+ 1)
(n2 + 1)
(  c)  R

m +
(n  1)
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk

. (10)
Now turning to the rm-level, the rst-order condition (1) for rm i in state m implies that, in
equilibrium, bxmi = byi + (  ci)=   ( bXm + mR). Inserting (10) and rearranging gives:
bxmi = byi + (  ci)   mR  n(n+ 1)

n(n+ 1)
(n2 + 1)
(  c)  R

m +
(n  1)
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk

= byi + 1


(  ci)  n
2
(n2 + 1)
(  c)

  R
(n+ 1)

m  
n(n  1)
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk

. (11)
Recalling from Lemma 2 that byi = (n 1)n PMk=1 kbxki , and using (11) in it repeatedly gives:
byi = (n  1)
n
byi + 1


(  ci)  n
2
(n2 + 1)
(  c)

  R
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk

=) byi = (n  1) 1


(  ci)  n
2
(n2 + 1)
(  c)

  R
(n2 + 1)
XM
k=1
kk

. (12)
Finally, using (12) in (11) and solving yields the formula for bxmi .
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